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Abstract  
Adding to the growing scholarship on the use and role of social media in election 
campaigning, this paper examines and compares the character and determinants of Internet 
XVHUV¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWKpolitical party communication in 2013 and 2015 Parliamentary 
election campaigns in Czechia and Poland. Apart from the relationship between the thematic 
focus of party-SURGXFHGFRQWHQWDQGWKHOHYHORIXVHUV¶LQWHUDFWLYLW\WKHVWXG\DOVRH[SORUHV
the way tKHWRQDOLW\RIXVHUV¶FRPPHQWVLVLQIOXHQFHGE\GLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIparty 
communicationDVZHOODVE\XVHUV¶gender. The results suggest that the level of support for a 
party status is largely independent of the content of the message in both countries. The type 
of content has, however, an effect on the intensity of criticism by the users, with policy-
related subjects generating more negativity than mobilization- or campaign-oriented statuses. 
Finally, the study points to both gender gaps and gender as a strong predictor of user 
negativity, as female users ± while constituting a minority of participants in both countries ± 
tend to be significantly less negative in their comments towards the home party. Overall, the 
comparative study reveals both similarities and differences in the way Czech and Polish 
SDUWLHV¶XWLOL]H)DFHERRNDVFDPSDLJQSODWIRUPDVZHOODVLQWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH,QWHUQHWXVHUV¶
engagement with parties messages.  
Keywords: election campaign; social media; Facebook; comparative research; content 
analysis; online political expression 
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Introduction 
Over the course of the last decade, social media have been gaining an increasing 
importance as communication tools used by political parties and individual political actors to 
engage with citizens and to mobilize voters in election campaigns. The success of Barack 
Obama 2008 campaign (e.g. Johnson and Perlmutter, 2010) sparked a wave of interest in the 
adoption of social networking sites for campaign purposes in other settings, a process that has 
arguably been stimulated and intensified by the growing penetration of social media 
platforms across the globe. According to recent estimates, there were over 2.8 billion active 
social media users at the beginning of 2017, nearly 2 billion of which are using Facebook as 
the globally dominant social network (We Are Social and Hootsuite, 2017). The rapid 
proliferation of social media and their increasing use as primary news sources (Reuters 
Institute, 2017) has instigated a significant transformation of political communication, with 
parties and candidates utilizing these digital tools to communicate directly with their 
electorate, bypassing thereby the traditional gate-keeping role of mainstream news media. 
While for traditional parties, the adoption of social networks largely meant 
broadening the existing range of existing campaign tools which are still being used and 
considered no less important by the party managers (Lilleker et al., 2015), many new parties 
and candidates who have attempted to present themselves as an alternative to the established 
political system have placed the Internet and social media at the forefront of their 
communication strategies, and have been building their electoral base primarily through these 
online channels. The networking, community-building potential of social media platforms, 
coupled with the cost-effectiveness of their use, has also been linked with the current rise of 
populism across Europe, both on the left- and right-side of ideological spectrum, as parties 
including Podemos (Spain), the Five Stars Movement (Italy), Alternative für Deutschland 
(Germany), Le Front National (France) or the Pirate Party in both Sweden and German have 
been heavily exploring the potential of social media and owe their electoral success largely to 
their ability to mobilize voters online (Aalberg et al., 2017; Engesser et al., 2017).  
The use of social media by parties for electoral campaigning has been subject of a 
mounting volume of political communication research in the last several years, mainly as 
single-state case studies (Baxter and Marcella, 2012; Enli and Skogerbø, 2013;Nielsen and 
Vaccari, 2013; Klinger, 2013; Williams and Gulati, 2013; Jungherr, 2016; Groshek and Koc-
Michalska, 2017) or ± significantly less often ± as two-states comparative studies (Larsson 
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and Moe, 2013; Larsson and Kalsnes, 2014; Geber and Scherer, 2015; Graham et al., 2016)1. 
However, the geographical scope of the existing research in this field has been rather limited, 
with the majority of studies originating from the U.S. and from Western/ Northern European 
democracies. So far, only a few studies published in international journals have empirically 
tackled the role of social media in election campaigns in Central and Eastern Europe (âWČWND
and Vochocová, 2014; Baranowski, 2015; Bene, 2016), and all of them have been dealing 
with only a single state settings.  
Apart from spatial limitations, the existing research displays notable gaps in research 
design and focus. Most studies examining the way social networks have been utilized by 
parties for campaign purposes concentrate on the extent and intensity of adoption and on 
SDUWLHV¶ ability to generate interactions with their messages. The research has been mainly 
designed to test the normalization hypothesis (Margolis and Resnick, 2000), expecting the 
existing inequalities among political parties in the offline environment to be more or less 
replicated in the domain of internet-based communication technologies. In contrast, studies 
on the actual content of communication produced by both parties and social media users in 
the course of an election campaign have been far less frequent. In other words, only limited 
attention has been paid to how people UHDFWWRSDUWLHV¶FDPSDLJQFRPPXQLFDWLRQRQVRFLDO
media beyond the mere interaction metrics. Also, among other gaps, we still have limited 
understanding of the users who contribute to social media profiles of political parties, in 
terms of their sociodemographic characteristics, and how do these relate to the content 
produced during the period of election campaign.   
This paper aims to fill at least some of these research gaps by exploring and 
comparing how the main political parties in Poland and Czechia used Facebook to interact 
with citizens during the last parliamentary election campaigns in 2015 and 2013, respectively. 
Apart from the above academic arguments for undertaking our study, the rationale for 
comparative analysis of the use of social media in election campaigns in Poland and Czechia 
is based on similarities in political regimes and media landscapes. Both democracies, which 
transitioned from state socialism to democracy after 1989, entered the European Union in 
2004, share multiparty parliamentary systems, and until recently have been considered poster 
examples of successful democratic transformation. However, both have currently underwent 
turbulent changes to their political systems that brought newcomers ± including populist 
parties ± WRWKHHOHFWLRQUDFHDQGLQFUHDVHGSROLWLFDOSRODUL]DWLRQDVZHOODVYRWHUV¶SHUFHLYHG
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dissatisfaction with democracy (Stanley, 2016; CtVDĜ Our comparative design, 
focusing in both cases on the national parliamentary elections which saw social media being 
adopted as a full-fledged part of the campaign mix by nearly all parties, enables us to gauge 
the level of homogenization of campaign communication by political parties beyond the 
scope of just one political system. Ultimately, it allows us to determine whether and how the 
interactions between parties and citizens on social media during the campaign differ from the 
patterns revealed by the scholarship.  
 
Social Media as Sites of Interaction and Contestation 
The ability to directly interact with the public has traditionally been highlighted as one 
of the main attractions of the Web 2.0 communication technologies for political parties and 
candidates in election campaigns (Boulianne, 2015). Social networking sites such as 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube or Instagram gave political actors the opportunity not only to 
promote and disseminate messages about their policies among their followers and to mobilize 
voters, but also to obtain an instant, quantifiable evidence of the level of engagement with of 
their online communication via social buttons (e.g. µlike¶, µshare¶, µretweet¶DQGXVHUV¶ 
comments. However, studies have confirmed that parties and politicians rarely use social 
media for conversation with voters. In fact, the top-down approach, signalling self-promotion 
and dissemination of messages in a one-way direction is a far more common way of utilizing 
social media by political actors ( Lilleker and Koc-Michalska, 2013; Klinger, 2013; 
Gerodimos and Justinussen, 2015; Lilleker et al., 2016). 
The question of an impact of social networking sites on political communication, as 
measured by the engagement metrics, has been an established part of academic research ever 
since the dawn of the political adoption of social media, especially during election times 
(Bronstein, 2013; Williams and Gulati, 2013; Larsson and Kalsnes, 2014; Jungherr, 2016). 
Various studies have explored the relationship between both formal features and content 
orientation RISDUWLHV¶DQGFDQGLGDWHV¶SRVWVDQGWKHOHYHORIHQJDJHPHQWWKH\JHQHUDWHGRQ
the side of social media users. In their analysis of Facebook posts Norwegian party leaders 
during the 2013 Parliamentary election campaign, Larsson and Kalsnes (2014) found out that 
posts featuring either an acknowledgement to supporters or co-workers, as well as those 
containing critique of their opponents or other actors (essentially negative news) fare better in 
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terms of likes and comments than other type of content (i.e. informing, mobilization or 
personal posts).  
%URQVWHLQ¶V investigation of the Facebook pages of the two contenders for the 
2012 U.S. Presidential Elections, Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, revealed that statuses on 
those two pages did not display much commonalities with regards to their engagement 
metrics; while statuses posted by Romney were more successful when containing either an 
HPRWLRQDODSSHDORUUHIHUULQJWR5RPQH\¶VSHUVRQDOFUHGLELOLW\2EDPD¶VSRVWVJHQHUDWHGWKH
highest amount of likes when appealing to ORJLFDQGUHDVRQLHE\SUHVHQWLQJ³IDFWVand 
ILJXUHVWKDWVXSSRUWHGWKHFDQGLGDWH¶VFODLP´%URQVWHLQ, 2013: 177). In another study, 
tackling the same elections, Gerodimos and Justinussen (2015) revealed that the presence of 
Barack Obama in a photo generated higher engagement with the post in terms of likes, shares 
and comments then posts without it, but the engagement was even higher when the post 
contained a picture of his family. Posts about policy or %DUDFN2EDPD¶VFKDUDFWHUKDG
significantly more shares than personal appeals and promotional statuses. However, when 
examining WKHSRVWV¶UKHWRULFWKHILQGLQJVKDYHDSSDUHQWO\FRQWUDGLFWHGWKRVHE\%URQVWHLQ
DVHPRWLRQDODFFODLPV³UHFHLYHGRQDYHUDge 50,000 more likes than nonemotional 
RQHV´*HURGLPRVDQG-XVWLQXVVHQ: 14). Examining interactions between candidates to 
Hungarian Parliament and their followers during the 2014 election campaign, Bene (2016: 
513) came to the conclusion that ³FLWL]HQVDUHKLJKO\UHDFWLYHWRQHJDWLYHHPRWLRQ-filled, text-
using, personal, and activity-GHPDQGLQJSRVWV´ZLWKYLGHRVDQGPHPHVKDYLQJDSDUWLFXODUO\
good chance of spreading virally through sharing. Attempting to add to this arguably still 
very fragmHQWHGHYLGHQFHRQWKHXVHUV¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWKGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRISROLWLFDOFRQWHQW
in campaign communication, while bringing the debate into the still very much unexplored 
research territory of Central Europe, our study therefore asks: 
 
(RQ1) What drove the engagement of Facebook users with the content produced by 
political parties during the election campaigns in Poland and Czechia? 
 
Although the number of likes, shares or comments is a valuable indicator of the 
SROLWLFDODFWRU¶VDELOLW\WRJHQHUDWHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ³IORZ´LQWKHVRFLDOPHGLDHQYLURQPHQWit 
is not necessarily a perfect proxy for the popularity of a particular post, or for the strength of 
support from the fans. The dialogic affordances of social media, enabling the users not only 
WRVKRZ³ZHDN´HQJDJHPHQWvia social buttons, but also to leave their comments, open 
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potentially door to critical debate which can fill the space under the original post with 
disagreement, negativity towards the party or a candidate, or even worse. Allowing citizens to 
SDUWLFLSDWHRQWKHFDPSDLJQE\SURGXFLQJFRQWHQWRQSDUWLHV¶VRFLDOPHGLDFKDQQHOV± that is, 
involving them in the ³FR-FUHDWLRQ´RIWKHcampaign content, which has been emphasized as 
one of the benefits of Web 2.0 campaigning (c.f. Lilleker and Jackson, 2010 ) ± can be a 
double-edge strategy, and might involve an additional effort in moderating or censoring 
unwelcomed messages (with the risk of generating negative publicity for the actor).  
Remarkably, however, only a handful of studies have explored WKHLVVXHRIXVHUV¶
negativity (or tonality/valence in general) in comments RQFDQGLGDWHV¶RUSDUWLHV¶VRFLDO
media sites so far, with most of them conducted outside of Europe2. Studies conducted in 
context of the U.S. congressional or Presidential elections (Sweetser and Lariscy, 2008; 
Fernandes et al., 2010; Woolley et al., 2010; Bronstein, 2013) mostly came to the conclusion 
that user-JHQHUDWHGFRQWHQWRQFDQGLGDWHV¶)DFHERRNSDJHVLVSUHGRPLQDQWO\SRVLWLYHLn tone 
and mainly (although by far not exclusively) supportive to the candidate. MacNamara and 
Kenning (2011: 13IRXQGRQO\³DQHJOLJLEOHQXPEHURIFULWLFDORUQHJDWLYHFRPPHQWV´RQ
social media sites of politicians and political parties during the 2007 Australian Parliamentary 
elections. In Japan, the analysis by Xue (2014) discovered that most comments on Facebook 
pages of candidates for the Japanese 2013 Upper House parliamentary elections were 
positive. In contrast to most of the above quoted papers, the study of the 2013 Czech 
Parliamentary elections by âWČWNDDQGVochocová (2014) revealed a rather high amount of 
negativity aimed at political parties on their own Facebook pages, as 25% of all comments 
were classified as negative WRZDUGV³KRPH´SDUW\however, this share was notably higher (up 
to 62%) in case of the major parties. Inspired by the above mentioned pioneer scholarship on 
XVHUV¶FRQWHQWSURGXFWLRQZLWKLQFDPSDLJQVZHWKHUHIRUHZDQWWRH[DPLQH 
 
(RQ2) To what extent did the theme of the mother-post shape the tonality of social media 
discussions in Poland and Czechia? 
 
The notion of µtonality¶ in political campaigning is linked to the so-called µJHQGHU
JDS¶GHEDWH in scholarship on political participation. The literature on political participation 
and user-generated contents suggests a gender-based participation gap, whereby women are 
less likely to create content online, and less likely to engage with political contents online. 
Nevertheless, studies specifically focusing on political engagement on social media are far 
from being conclusive and lack broader perspective. For example, in their study of political 
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participation in Czechia, Vochocová et al. (2016: 1333) argue that ³FRQWUDU\WRSRSXODU 
perception, gender remains a significant predictor of certain types of online political 
H[SUHVVLRQ´ In contrast to that, findings of a recent study of political participation on social 
media in United States reveal that gender differeQFHV³VHHPPXFKOHVVSHUYDVLYHLQSROLWLFDO
engagement on social media than might have been expected. Men are more likely to post 
political information, and women are slightly more likely to unfriend people for political 
reasons, but all other specifications of political engagement in social media showed no gender 
GLIIHUHQFHV´ (Bode, 2017: 698). Given the above tensions in the literature, we consider the 
notion of tonality as a proxy for gender-driven political expression on social media (see Gil 
de Zúñiga, Jung and Valenzuela, 2012; Rojas and PuigǦiǦAbril, 2009), and pose our third 
research question, namely,  
 
(RQ3) 7RZKDWH[WHQWGLGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶JHQGHULPSDFWRQWKHLQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQ
political parties and citizens on social media in campaign communication in Poland and 
Czechia? 
 
 
Polish and Czech Election Campaigns in Comparative Perspective  
 
7KHUHVHDUFKRQVRFLDOPHGLDLQWKHFRQWH[WRI3RODQG¶VHOHFWLRQVhas thus far involved 
two distinct strands of research: first, analysing the adoption of social media into election 
campaigning by political parties and actors (Koc-Michalska et al., 2014; Koc-Michalska and 
Lilleker, 2014), and the latter, emphasizing the role of social media for deliberative 
democracy (-DFXĔVNLDQG%DUDQRZVNL. In Czechia, social media have made first 
notable entry into the sphere of politics with the 2010 parliamentary elections, which have 
altered a long-lasting pattern of power shift between two dominant political parties (Hanley, 
2012). Following the 2010 elections, research has gradually started to explore the 
incorporation of social media into campaigning (âWČWNDDQG9RFKRFRYi; Macková et 
al., 2017).  
In the studies on political communication, Poland and Czechia have typically been 
coupled in the context of WKHDQDO\VLVRIµWUDGLWLRQDO¶ media (Voltmer, 2013; Tworzecki and 
Semetko, 2012; Halin and Mancini, 2012). Only recently, scholarship focused on 
comparative analysis of how social media in CEE contribute to the democratisation in politics 
(Placek, 2016) or mapped out the role of social media in the evolution of political 
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communication practices in the region  6XURZLHFDQGâWČWNDGiven that comparative 
research of social media campaigns is relatively rare, it transpires there is no single study 
comparing the dynamics of social media usage and engagement in political campaigns in 
Poland and Czechia.  
Our study aims to change this state of affairs, by comparing data from two recent 
Parliamentary election campaigns in both countries: the 2013 elections in Czechia and the 
2015 elections in Poland. Both elections brought substantial changes to the respective 
political systems. In Czechia, the October 2013 snap elections were marked by a near-victory 
of the new populist movement ANO 2011 that managed to gain 18.6% of the vote, less than 
EHKLQGWKHZLQQHUWKH6RFLDO'HPRFUDWLF3DUW\ý66'$SDUWIURPANO 2011, 
another new populist party which entered the Parliament after the 2013 elections was Dawn 
of Direct Democracy led by Tomio Okamura (6.9% of votes). Other parties that exceeded the 
WKUHVKROGDQGHQWHUHGWKH3DUOLDPHQWZHUHWKH&RPPXQLVW3DUW\.6ý0
conservative TOP 09 (12%) and ODS (7.7%), and the Christian Democrats (KDU-ý6/
6.7%).  
 
In Poland, the 2015 Parliamentary elections were held on 25 October, but already the 
Presidential elections of 10 and 24 May earlier that year were seen as indicator of shifting 
political moods among votes. Following the election of Andrzej Duda, the candidate backed 
by the conservative-populist Law and Solidarity party (PiS), the political capital of this party 
got even stronger, resulting in their victory in the 2015 Parliamentary election with 37.58% of 
votes. The second place was secured by the Christian democratic liberals of Civic Platform 
(the PO) with 24.09% of votes, followed by the conservative .XNL]µWKHliberal 
µ0RGHUQ¶1RZRF]HVQDDQGthe centrist-agrarians of the PSL which received 5.13 % 
votes (National Electoral Commission, 2017).  
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
In order to examine and compare patterns of engagement of citizens with online content 
produced by political parties, as specified by our research questions, we used manual content 
analysis (Neuendorff, 2012; Riffe et al., 2005) oQDVDPSOHRISDUWLHV¶)DFHERRNVWDWXVHVDQG
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XVHUV¶FRPPHQWVUHDFWLQJRQWKHP:HFRGHGERWKIRUPDOIHDWXUHVRISDUWLHV¶VWDWXVHV
(number of likes, shares and comments; length; presence of photo; presence of video; 
presence of hyperlink to external content) as well as the character of content (main thematic 
focus ± distinguishing between mobilization messages; campaign-oriented posts of 
predominantly informational character; policy-oriented posts; and ³other´)RUXVHUV¶
comments and replies, our variables included assumed gender of the user; valence 
SUHGRPLQDQWWRQHRIWKHFRPPHQWWRZDUGVWKH³KRPHSDUW\´LHWKHSDUW\RQZKRVH
Facebook page the comment was made, and valence of the comment towards another party. 
Valence was coded on a three-point scale (positive, negative and ambivalent/neutral). Coding 
was performed by two coders for the Czech sample and two other coders for the Polish 
sample. In both cases the coders went through several rounds of intercoder reliability testing, 
until an acceptable level of Krippendorff¶V alpha was reached (at least 0.67, see Lombard et 
al., 2002).3 The data were further analysed using bivariate and linear regression analysis in 
the statistical programme R.  
 
Data and sample  
 
The data for the analysis were collected from official Facebook fan pages of seven Czech and 
eight Polish political parties, from the period of one week before elections, that is, 6 days 
before and including the election days in the Czech case (21-26 October 2013), and 5 days in 
case of Poland (19-23 October 2015), as the Polish law prohibits any form of campaigning, 
including on social media, during the election days. The Polish sample included all parties 
that entered the Parliament following the 2015 elections. In case of Czechia, the technical 
problems during the data collection did not make it possible to include two parties that 
reached the election threshold (TOP 09 on 4th place and KDU-ý6/RQth place); instead, the 
sample was amended by two parties that finished just before the gates of Parliament, the 
Green Party (8th) and the Pirate Party (9th). 
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Table 1: Parties in the sample by country and party ideology 
Czechia Poland 
Party Name Party ideology Party Name Party ideology 
CSSD socialist ZL socialist 
ODS conservative PSL agrarian/centre 
KSCM radical left PO christian democratic 
Greens green KORWiN conservative 
ANO centrist/populist PiS radical right 
USVIT radical right Razem socialist 
Pirates liberal Kukiz conservative 
  
Nowoczesna liberal 
 
The Facebook pages were systematically monitored and archived every day using the plug-in 
ScrapBook for Mozilla Firefox browser. Following previous studies (âWČWNDDQG9RFKRFRYi
2014; Garcia-Blanco, 2014) we decided to collect only first 30 comments (and/or replies) to 
HDFKLQGLYLGXDOSDUW\VWDWXV³PRWKHUSRVW´GXULQJWKHGHVLJQDWHGWLPHSHULRGLQRUGHUWR
limit the size of the sample. This sampling strategy resulted in following sample size: 
 Table 2: Size of the sample by the type of the unit 
 Czechia Poland 
1XPEHURISDUW\VWDWXVHV³PRWKHUSRVWV´ 278 337 
1XPEHURIXVHUV¶FRPPHQWV 3436 3295 
1XPEHURIXVHUV¶UHSOLHV 3392 3300 
Total number of units  7106 6932 
 
Results 
Comparing the activity of political parties in the last campaign week (see Figure 1), it is 
apparent that in the Czech case, the challengers (Pirates, ANO, Greens and Usvit) invested 
much more effort into their Facebook campaign, producing higher amount of statuses than 
the incumbent parties; nevertheless ± and unsurprisingly ± there was no correlation between 
this activity and the election results. In Polish case, it was very much the other way around: 
traditional parties, including the two dominant ones, PiS and PO, were the ones with the 
highest FB activity, indicating the effects of the normalization hypothesis (Hirzalla et. al., 
2010), which indeed reinforces the previous findings from the study by Koc-Michalska et al. 
(2014) showing that major parties are more attuned to the use of social media. The 
challengers clearly did not put as much effort into this campaign channel ± but still, at least in 
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case of Kukiz, managed to secure the third place in the election race. This political movement 
ZDVODUJHO\VHHQDVDFKDOOHQJHUDQGD³SURWHVWYRWH´RIYHU\PXFKULJKW-wing affiliations. 
Our results reveal a strong social media activity by the KORWiN, formally new, libertarian-
conservative party, however headed and publicly represented by a seasoned politician, Janusz 
Korwin-Mikke.  
Figure 1: Number of party posts (bars, left axis) during the last week of campaign compared to election results (dots, right 
axis) 
 
In terms of the content of the party posts, the two campaigns clearly displayed some 
differences ± Czech parties focused primarily on mobilization (urging their fans to come vote 
and support them), while the Polish ones predominantly used Facebook as an information 
channel, publishing campaign-related news and information, including results of polls. 
Consistent with RWKHUVFKRODUV¶REVHUYDWLRQVabout the tendency of political candidates to 
avoid policy-related themes in their online SROLWLFDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQFRQVLGHUHGD³ULVN\´
terrain (Stromer-Galley, 2000), our findings confirm that the presence of policy issues in 
SDUWLHV¶ Facebook communication lagged visibly behind the other categories.  
Table 3: Dominant theme of party posts  ? distribution by country 
 
Czechia Poland 
 Theme Count % Count % 
Campaign 88 32% 129 38% 
Mobilization 129 46% 88 26% 
Policy 30 11% 51 15% 
Other 31 11% 69 21% 
 12 
 
In order to answer our first research question, we have analysed whether there is any 
relationship between the type of content produced by the parties and the level of engagement 
by the Facebook users. For aggregated data, the results (Fig. 2) suggest that it does not seem 
to matter too much whether party statuses focus on campaign information, try to mobilize 
their voters or address a particular policy issue. The distribution of likes is fairly similar, 
H[FHSWIRUWKHSRVWVLQWKHFDWHJRU\³RWKHU´ZKLFKshow bimodality, possibly because this is a 
residual category. In sum, they seem to perform significantly worse. 
Figure 2: Engagement with party posts by their theme (both countries combined) - LIKES 
 
Note: Natural logarithm is computed from likes to adjust for their otherwise highly skewed 
distribution. Notches on boxplots indicate 95% CI for medians. The line around boxplots marks 
Kernel density turned by 90 degrees and mirrored on both sides of the boxplot (a.k.a. violin chart). 
We also conducted ANOVA for the plot, F-statistic: 32.35 on 3 and 611 DF, p-value: < 0.001. 
 
However, looking at the same data by country, some differences emerge. Campaign and 
policy statuses seem to perform better than mobilization in Poland. This result goes hand-in-
hand with the previously reported finding according to which Polish parties posted relatively 
less content related to mobilization than Czech ones; the users seemed to repeat that pattern 
in their engagement with these types of content, both when measured by likes (Fig. 3) and 
comments (Fig.4). On the contrary, Czech parties produced relatively more posts on 
mobilization, and these performed quite well in terms of likes and comments by users. 
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Figure 3: Engagement with party posts by their theme and by country  ? LIKES 
 
Note: We conducted ANOVA for the plot with following results: F-statistic: 29 on 7 and 607 DF,  p-
value: < 0.001. 
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Figure 4: Engagement with party posts by their theme and by country  ? COMMENTS 
 
Note: We conducted ANOVA for the plot with following results: F-statistic:  22.8 on 7 and 607 DF,  
p-value: < 0.001. 
 
What drives XVHUV¶interactions? 
In the next step, we conducted several rounds of exploratory regression analyses to compare 
the influence of party versus the influence of formal or content character of the posts 
(statuses). Table 4 and 5 present a regression of a natural logarithm of likes on two sets of 
characteristics: a) party authoring the post and b) other posts¶ characteristics, i.e. its theme 
and some formal characteristics (presence of a photo, a video and a link in the posts, and the 
overall length of the post).  The regressions indicate that for both countries, the willingness of 
XVHUVWRJLYH³OLNHV´WRSDUW\VWDWXVHVLVGULYHQPXFKPRUHE\WKHLUpreferences for the 
respective party, rather than by formal or content character of the statuses.4  
Analysing the Czech data, only mobilization posts performed robustly better than other 
categories, indicating why Czech parties favour this type of posts over others. In model 2, 
presence of a hyperlink seems to decrease engagement, while length, somewhat surprisingly, 
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increases engagement, but both effects disappear when parties enter the model (model 3). In 
contrast, presence of a photo seems to perform better in the full model.  
As for the Polish data, the disappearance of most content-related effects in the full model 
(model 3) indicates that WKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQXVHUV¶HQJDJHPHQWZHUHDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\FDXVHG
by whichever party produced the post. The only formal or content-related feature of a party 
status that displays statistically significant (thought still marginal) influence on the amount of 
likes is length, which ± contrary to the findings from the Czech sample ± appears to decrease, 
rather than increase, engagement with the status. 
If we look at individual parties, Table 4 shows that the pattern of underperforming traditional 
parties in Czechia in terms of the number of posts they produce (see Figure 1) also holds for 
the number of likes these posts generate.. On the contrary, all the alternative parties in the 
sample gain more likes for their posts, even if the difference is statistically significant only 
for two of them compared to the then-victorious CSSD.  
A slightly different story unfolds for Poland. PiS ± the winner of the election ± is a party 
labelled as traditional/incumbent, but it has the best performing posts, comparable only to 
Razem, an alternative party. Also for the rest of the Polish sample, there seems to be no 
strong division between traditional and alternative parties in their SRVWV¶performance.5  
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Table 4: Linear regression of ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨůŽŐůŝŬĞƐŽŶƉŽƐƚƐ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?Czechia 
CZECHIA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Difference S.E. Difference S.E. Difference S.E. 
(Intercept) 5,11*** 0,21 5,31*** 0,18 4,3*** 0,27 
Party (Reference = CSSD)             
ANO 0,84*** 0,24 - - 1,12*** 0,23 
KSCM -0,21 0,45 - - -0,29 0,43 
ODS -0,41 0,25 - - -0,3 0,24 
Usvit 0,2 0,24 - - 0,5* 0,24 
Pirates 1,08*** 0,23 - - 1,43*** 0,23 
Greens 0,26 0,24 - - 0,44 0,23 
Theme (Reference = Campaign)             
Mobilization - - 0,35* 0,14 0,54*** 0,12 
Policy - - -0,24 0,21 0,33 0,19 
Other - - 0,2 0,22 0,38* 0,19 
Photo: Yes - - 0,02 0,15 0,41** 0,14 
Video: Yes - - -0,2 0,19 0,17 0,17 
Link: Yes - - -0,3* 0,14 -0,13 0,12 
Length - - 0,05** 0,02 0,01 0,02 
Adjusted R-squared 0,239   0,074   0,340   
 
Table 5: >ŝŶĞĂƌƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨůŽŐůŝŬĞƐŽŶƉŽƐƚƐ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ? Poland 
POLAND Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
  Difference S,E, Difference S,E, Difference S,E, 
(Intercept) 6,88*** 0,13 5,68*** 0,28 7,14*** 0,24 
Party (Reference = PiS)             
PO -0,44* 0,17 - - -0,48** 0,17 
Razem 0,25 0,21 - - 0,39 0,22 
Korwin -0,58*** 0,17 - - -0,32 0,19 
PSL -4,13*** 0,17 - - -4,04*** 0,22 
ZL -1,23*** 0,16 - - -1,21*** 0,19 
Kukiz -0,8*** 0,21 - - -0,75** 0,25 
Nowoczesna -0,14 0,24 - - 0,23 0,28 
Theme (Reference = Campaign)             
Mobilization - - -0,52** 0,20 -0,12 0,13 
Policy - - -0,36 0,23 0,05 0,14 
Other - - -2,29*** 0,22 -0,24 0,17 
Photo: Yes - - 0,9*** 0,20 0,11 0,14 
Video: Yes - - 0,58* 0,23 -0,23 0,16 
Link: Yes - - 0,14 0,17 -0,11 0,11 
Length - - 0 0,03 -0,06** 0,02 
Adjusted R-squared 0,748   0,342   0,759   
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Tonality of comments: policy issues as catalysts of negativity  
The distribution of tonality ZLWKLQXVHUV¶FRPPHQWVVKRZVVRPHLQWHUHVWLQJVLPLODULWLHV
between the two countries. In case of both the Polish and Czech parties, users tended to be 
PRVWFULWLFDOWRZDUGVWKH³KRPH´SDUW\WKHSDUW\RQZKRVHFacebook profile they 
commented on) when the party status concerned a policy issue. This effect was stronger in 
Czechia. On the other hand, in both countries the mobilization and campaign statuses 
encouraged much more positive comments by users. This finding might provide yet another 
explanation why neither Czech nor Polish parties ± even in the social media environment ±  
are too keen on highlighting policy issues in their campaign communication, focusing on 
simple mobilization messages instead, as it helps them avoid becoming targets of criticism.  
Figure 5: Tonality of comments and replies ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŚŽŵĞƉĂƌƚǇŐƌŽƵƉĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞŽĨ ?ŵŽƚŚĞƌ-ƉŽƐƚ ? ? CZECHIA 
 
Note: Chi-square test for the relation between mother-SRVWWKHPHDQGFRPPHQWV¶UHSOLHV¶HPRWLRQ;-
squared = 112.65, df = 6, p-value < 0.001. 
 18 
 
Figure 6: Tonality of comments and replies ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŚŽŵĞƉĂƌƚǇŐƌŽƵƉĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞŽĨ ?ŵŽƚŚĞƌ-ƉŽƐƚ ? ? POLAND 
 
Note: Chi-square test for the relation between mother-SRVWWKHPHDQGFRPPHQWV¶UHSOLHV¶HPRWLRQ;-
squared = 49.374, df = 6, p-value < 0.001. 
 
Gender matters: XVHUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQand comments tonality  
While most recent research suggests that gender differences in political participation are 
dwindling (e.g. Bode, 2017), online political expression still shows big differences between 
men and women in both countries in our study. As Figure 7 demonstrates, two-thirds of 
Polish commentators are men, while only 28% has been identified as women (the remaining 
5% were unidentified due to neutral or ambiguous profile names). Still, in comparison with 
the Czech data, the gap between men and women is slightly smaller, which might possibly be 
attributed to the fact that in the 2015 Polish elections, the leaders of both strongest parties ± 
PiS and PO ± were women (Beata 6]\GáRDQG(ZD.DPLĔska), something that might have 
encouraged higher participation of female Facebook users.  
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Figure 7: Proportions of comments and replies by gender in each country 
 
Note: Chi-square test for the relation between country and gender: X-squared = 142.27, df = 2, p-
value < 0.001. 
 
With regards to the relationship between gender of participants and the tonality of their 
FRPPHQWVRXUUHVXOWVGRFXPHQWVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQWGLVWULEXWLRQVRISRVLWLYHQHJDWLYH
comments among men and women. It turns out that female contributors tend to post 
VLJQL¿FDQWO\PRUHSRVLWLYHFRPPHQWVZKHQUHIHUULQJWRWKHµKRPHSDUW\¶LQWKH&]HFKFDVH
FDVHVRIZRPHQ¶VFRPPHQWVZHUHSRVLWLYHFRQWUDU\WRRISRVLWLYHFRPPHQWV
produced by men. When it comes to comments aimed at another party ± that is, the 
competitors in the campaign ± women were however no less negative than men, displaying 
similar level of negativity. This suggests that women are behaving on the profile of a 
particular party more like party fans and supporters, rather than critics or trolls, which seems 
to be the domain of men.  
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Figure 8: Comments' and replies' emotion by gender  ? Czechia 
  
Note: Chi-square test for the relation between gender and emotion for home party: X-squared = 
213.12, df = 2, p-value < 0.001. Chi-square test for the relation between gender and emotion for other 
party: X-squared = 3.90, df = 2, p-value = 0.14. 
These findings are very much mirrored by the Polish data ± with the difference that the 
proportion of positive comments by women is somewhat smaller than in the Czech case (68% 
vs 76%), but still visibly bigger than the male ones. However, women are clearly more 
negative towards other parties than men, which suggests that if they are participating, they do 
that in the role of a trusty party supporter rather than someone who aims to disrupt the 
FDPSDLJQVSLULWDQGDFWDV³GLVOR\DO´WRWKHSDUW\RQZKRVHSURILOHWKHGHEDWHWDNHVSODFH 
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Figure 9: Comments' and replies' emotion by gender  ? Poland 
 
Note: Chi-square test for the relation between gender and emotion for home party: X-squared = 
60.559, df = 2, p-value < 0.001. Chi-square test for the relation between gender and emotion for other 
party: X-squared = 12.37, df = 2, p-value = 0.002. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The SXUSRVHRIWKHVWXG\ZDVWRH[DPLQHLQDFRPSDUDWLYHIDVKLRQSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV¶XVHRI
Facebook in the recent Czech and Polish Parliamentary Election campaigns, and selected 
DVSHFWVRI)DFHERRNXVHUV¶HQJDJHPHQW 
Our findings demonstrate that the adoption of social media for election campaign 
purposes in Czechia and Poland, while showing certain tendencies towards homogeneity, is 
certainly not taking place according to one unified script. Political parties in both 
democracies displayed varying usage of Facebook as a campaign platform, and not just in 
terms of sheer intensity of communication, which confirms mobilization hypothesis in case of 
Czechia (challengers were more active on Facebook) but normalization hypothesis in case of 
Poland (big parties led the most intense Facebook campaign), but also in terms of the content. 
As documented above, Czech parties predominantly used this social media platform for 
mobilization of voters, whereas in case of political parties in Poland we found out that they 
tend to use it primarily for dissemination of campaign-related information, along the lines of 
WKH³JRRGROG´top-down approach to election campaigning (Lilleker and Koc-Michalska, 
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2013; Gerodimos and Justinussen, 2015). One commonality which emerged in both election 
campaigns is the limited attention paid by citizens to SROLF\WRSLFVLQWKHSDUWLHV¶VWDWXVHV, 
which is a finding that corroborates some observations made already at the onset of online 
political campaigning era (Stromer-Galley, 2000).  
Tonality of comments reinforces the policy-related findings of this study. Our data 
reveal that FaceERRNXVHUVWHQGHGWREHPRVWO\FULWLFDOWRZDUGV³KRPHSDUW\´RQSROLF\LVVXHV
DQGSRVLWLYHWRQDOLW\ZDVH[SOLFDWHGLQUHODWLRQWRFDPSDLJQV¶PRELOL]DWLRQSRVWV7RWKDWHQG
downplaying the role of policy proposals was quite likely geared towards limiting 
opportunities for public criticism of their policies. When contrasted with studies from Japan 
(Xue, 2014) or Australia (MacNamara and Kenning, 2011), it would however appear that 
Polish and Czech voters display greater levels of criticism in their engagement with parties on 
their Facebook pages, something that might have underpinnings in the differences in political 
cultures but ultimately requires further exploration.  
With regards to the role of gender in campaign-related online political participation, 
we find a greater diversity of online behaviour between men and women than indicated for 
example in the U.S. context, as revealed by Bode (2017). Consistent with the previous 
research (Vochocová et al., 2016), we have discovered that tonality is indeed significantly 
linked to gender imbalances in )DFHERRNXVHUV¶SROLWLFDOHQJDJHPHQWRQsocial media.  
Commenting on Facebook during an election campaign is a domain of men rather than 
women, and female users tend to post significantly more positive comments when referring to 
³KRPHSDUW\´. The only notable difference concerns the apparent tendency of the Polish 
women to be more negative WRZDUGV³RWKHUSDUWLHV´WKDQPHQ (a tendency not observed in the 
Czech data), which suggests that their engagement on social media during the campaign 
resembles more a fan-like behaviour akin to loyal party supporters, rather than critics or 
³WUROOV´DWWDFNLQJRWKHUSDUWLHVRQWKHLURZQSDJHVZKLFKDSSHDUVWREHDGLVFLSOLQH
performed predominantly by male users. 
)LQDOO\LQUHODWLRQWRWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIXVHUV¶LQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKSDUWLHV¶FRQWHQWRXU
findings do not paint an unambiguous picture, as the two datasets reveal some differences in 
the predictors of engagement. In the Czech case, it is the mobilization character of posts that 
stimulates the inflow of likes from users, alongside with the presence of a photo in the post; 
however, affiliation to protest (anti-system) parties (ANO 2011, Pirates, Usvit) seems to have 
an even stronger effect RQXVHUV¶LQWHUDFWLRQ,QFDVHRI3RODQGSDUWLHVGRPLQDWHLQWHUDFWLRQ
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patterns entirely ± the formal characteristics of posts do not appear to matter, as XVHUV¶
responsiveness WRSDUWLHV¶FRPPXQLFDWLRQ is clearly driven by their preference for a particular 
party, both challengers and incumbent ones. This suggests that Facebook engagement with 
party messages is to be understood predominantly as a fan-based activity, rather than an 
approval of a particular style of campaign communication. 
Overall, we believe our study highlights the need to examine the role and significance 
of social media in electoral campaigning using context-specific approach, particularly when 
analysing democracies undergoing a change of political system ± in this case, a change that is 
characterised by the emergence of new political actors, rising prominence of populism and 
tendencies towards democratic backsliding that is currently observed across the region of  
Central and Eastern Europe (see e.g. Ágh, 2016). While we are only beginning to uncover the 
impact of social media on these processes, some of the findings from this comparative 
research ± WKRVHSRLQWLQJWRZDUGVGLIIHUHQFHVLQSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV¶DGRSWLRQDVZHOODVLQ
determinants of users¶SROLWLFDOH[SUHVVLRQRQFacebook ± caution against applying uniform 
explanatory perspective when searching for the link between the increasing political use of 
social networking sites and the changing character of democracy in this part of Europe. 
Undoubtedly, this is an area awaiting further research explorations, which we hope our study 
will only encourage.  
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1 For a systematic review of research on the use of Twitter in election campaign, see Jungherr (2016). No such 
overview of the adoption and use of Facebook for campaign communication is known to the authors. 
 
2
 This argument refers merely to studies carried out on Facebook or YouTube. There has been a rising amount of 
studies exploring sentiment and negativity in communication during election campaigns on Twitter (for 
comprehensive overview see Jungherr, 2016). 
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3
 The K-alpha values for the majority of variables were reasonably high above the 0.67 borderline, i.e. the presence 
of video > 0.88 for both countries, presence of hyperlink > 0.82, gender > 0.89, length > 0.87, mobilization > 
0.77, policy issue > 0.76, personalization > 0.78, campaign > 0.70. In case of the variables for tonality of the 
comments which scored around or just below 0.70 K-alpha, additional coder training was carried out after the 
tests to maximise reliability.  
 
4
 We conducted similar analyses with both a natural logarithm of number of shares and comments as dependant 
variables. For both countries, models with comments as dependent variable showed very similar results as the 
models with likes as dependent variable published in Tables 4 and 5. Models with shares as dependent variable, 
on the other hand, showed somewhat different results in that they both explained much less variability in the 
data (23 % for the Czech data and only 20 % for the Polish data). We suspect that shares may be driven by a 
different dynamic than likes and comments. 
 
5
 Our tentative explanation for the striking difference in adjusted R-squared for both countries is that Polish 
parties are even more differentiated in their ability to address online audiences and inspire their engagement 
than Czech parties. This would at least explain why the authorship of a post explains so much variability in the 
Polish data.  
